Judicial Recovery for the Post-Service Tort: A Veteran\u27s Last Battle by Hislop-Brumfield, Lorna
McGeorge Law Review
Volume 14 | Issue 2 Article 10
1-1-1983
Judicial Recovery for the Post-Service Tort: A
Veteran's Last Battle
Lorna Hislop-Brumfield
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.pacific.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals and Law Reviews at Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion
in McGeorge Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact mgibney@pacific.edu.
Recommended Citation
Lorna Hislop-Brumfield, Judicial Recovery for the Post-Service Tort: A Veteran's Last Battle, 14 Pac. L. J. 333 (1983).
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.pacific.edu/mlr/vol14/iss2/10
brought to you by COREView metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk
provided by Scholarly Commons
Judicial Recovery for the Post-Service
Tort: A Veteran's Last Battle
Throughout the 1940s and 1950s the United States government con-
ducted experimental tests on unknowing military personnel.' The gov-
ernment never informed these people of the potential for future injury
as a result of the tests.2 Moreover, in many cases the government inten-
tionally concealed the facts surrounding these experiments from the
servicemen.' For example, over 200,000 troops have been exposed to
radiation. At times troops were stationed so close to an atomic blast
that the bones in their forearms were visible through their closed eyes.
5
Troops have been ordered to march toward the atomic blast site and
ordered so close that they were stopped by heat and wind.6 The only
precaution taken by the military was to sweep the dust off the soldiers
with a broom.7 Veterans believe that this exposure to radiation is now
causing them to contract cancer. A study performed at the Center for
Disease Control in Atlanta, Georgia corroborates their belief.' The
study indicates that nearly twice the expected leukemia9 is found
among veterans who attended the "Shot Smoky" atmospheric atomic
bomb test in 1957.10 Another study conducted by the National Associ-
ation of Atomic Vets noted a higher rate of maladies thought to be
linked with radiation in veterans who witnessed atomic tests." Expo-
sure to radiation has been linked to cancer and sterility. 2 Radiation is
also known to cause chromosome damage resulting in severe mental
and physical birth defects in children whose parents were exposed to
1. See Comment, Radiation Injury and the Atomic Veteran: Shiing the Burden of Proof on
Factual Causation, 32 HASTINGS LJ. 933, 934-35 (1981). This writer has made an attempt to use
non-sexist language in this comment whenever its use would not interfere with the flow of the text.
2. Id at 936.
3. See generally Everett v. United States, 492 F. Supp. 318 (S.D. Ohio 1980); Schnurman v.
United States, 490 F. Supp. 429 (E.D. Va. 1980); Thornwell v. United States, 471 F. Supp. 344
(D.D.C. 1979); See Comment, supra note 1, at 936.
4. See De Dominicis, Frustrated by the Feres Doctrine and the Veterans Administration,
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the radiation.13
Radiation, however, is not the only harmful substance servicemen
have been exposed to. The military also exposed these human "guinea
pigs"' 14 to sulphur mustard gas and L.S.D., 15 and during the Vietnam
war servicemen were also exposed to Agent Orange, a toxic chemical
defoliant. 6 Over eleven million gallons of Agent Orange herbicide
were sprayed over the jungles in Vietnam. 17 Soldiers lived in the jun-
gles and waded through the streams saturated with Agent Orange com-
pletely unaware of the devastating physical effects of this chemical.',
After these men were discharged, the military discovered that exposure
to the chemical was harmful to humans, yet the government never in-
formed the veterans of this discovery.19 The effects of exposure to
Agent Orange are being discovered only now and include cancer, liver
ailments, and nervous disorders.2 0 Agent Orange also affects the repro-
ductive organs and has been identified as a cause of still births and
birth defects.2'
Veterans injured by these toxic substances are barred from seeking
redress against the government under the Federal Torts Claims Act
22
due to court created governmental immunity for injuries that arise out
of military duty.23 The only benefits these veterans may receive are
recovered through the Veteran's Administration System. 4 Veterans
exposed to toxic substances receive virtually no compensation due to
problems with proof of causation and the fact that decisions of the Vet-
erans Administration (hereinafter referred to as the V.A.) are not ap-
pealable.2" The V.A. has received approximately 700 claims from
veterans with cancer allegedly caused by exposure to radiation.26 As of
13. Id at 31, 35.
14. M. UHL & T. ENSIGN, G.I. GUINEA PIGS (1981) (the term human guinea pigs is the title
of the book about radiation experiments conducted on servicemen).
15. Lysergic Acid Diethylamide.
16. See, e.g., Thornwell, 471 F. Supp. at 346 (L.S.D. experimentation); Everelte, 492 F. Supp.
at 319 (intentional exposure to radiation); Schnurman, 490 F. Supp. at 430 (exposure to mustard
gas); Comment, supra note 1, at 934-35.
17. See Assemblyman Pat Nolan, News Release, July 6, 1981 (copy on file at the Pacific Law
Journal).
18. See Assemblyman Pat Nolan, News Release, February 18, 1982 (copy on file at the Pa-
c/fic Law Journal).
19. See, ag., note 3 supra (examples of cases where injuries are emerging years after
exposure).
20. See Assemblyman Pat Nolan, News Release, April 14, 1981 (copy on file at the Pac/fc
Law Journal).
21. See News Release, supra note 18.
22. 28 U.S.C. §§2671-2680 (1976) [hereinafter referred to as the F.T.C.A.].
23. See generally Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950).
24. See 340 U.S. at 146. See generally 38 U.S.C. §§1-5228 (1976) (provides for veterans
benefits).
25. See De Dominicis, supra note 4, at 937; Comment, supra note 1. The V.A. has denied
ninety-eight percent of the claims for injuries claimed to be radiation related.
26. See De Dominicis, supra note 4, at 31.
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June 1982, only 16 of these claimants have been awarded benefits.27
Furthermore, children born with deformities and other birth defects
allegedly caused by their father's exposure to radiation, are not pro-
vided any compensation under the veteran's benefit statute.28 This lack
of compensation by the V.A. has forced veterans to seek judicial relief
against the United States government for their childrens' injuries.
29
The well established doctrine of governmental immunity, however, has
prevented veterans from any recovery.30
Veterans have attempted to overcome this immunity in a variety of
ways, but they have met with little success in the courts. 31  Veterans
have asserted a wide range of theories and approaches in their battle
including claims of constitutional violations against the government
32
and government officers, claims brought on behalf of children,33 claims
construed as arising out of nonservice activities,34 and claims involving
a separate tort occurring after service.3 5 The focus of this comment will
be on the post-service tort.
A cause of action for a post-service tort is based on the theory that
although a tort may begin during military service, the military has a
duty after the veterans are discharged to rescue them from the harm
caused during service .3 The post-service tort theory allows governmen-
tal immunity for injuries inflicted on servicemen during military duty
but demands recovery for injuries the veterans incur after discharge.3 7
The veterans exposed to dangerous substances during service must
bring suit after their discharge for governmental failure to reveal the
nature of the exposure upon their discharge.3 8 The claims asserted are
based on the theory that if the servicemen knew what they had been
exposed to, they could have sought medical aid immediately after
27. See id
28. The statute provides for benefits to "any veteran thus disabled.' 38 U.S.C. §334 (1976)
(because the child is not a veteran he or she will not recover).
29. See, eg., Monaco v. United States, 661 F.2d 129, 130 (9th Cir. 1981); Hinkie v. United
States, 524 F. Supp. 277, 279 (E.D. Penn. 1981).
30. See De Dominicis, supra note 4, at 35.
31. See Comment, supra note 1, at 960.
32. See Jaffee v. United States, 663 F.2d 1226, 1228 (3rd Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct.
2234 (1982).
33. See generally Monaco v. United States, 661 F.2d 129 (9th Cir. 1981) (denied the cause of
action); Hinkie v. United States, 524 F. Supp. 277 (E.D. Penn. 1981) (allowed a cause of action for
the chromosome damaged child).
34. See generally Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49 (1949); Mills v. Tucker, 499 F.2d 866
(9th Cir. 1974); Knecht v. United States, 144 F. Supp. 786 (E.D. Penn. 1956) affd. 242 F.2d 929
(3rd Cir. 1957).
35. See Thornwell v. United State5, 471 F. Supp. 344, 349 (D.D.C. 1979); Everett v. United
States, 492 F. Supp. 318, 320 (E.D. Va. 1980).
36. 471 F. Supp. at 349-51.
37. Id
38. Id
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discharge.39
This comment will explore the post-service tort theory by first re-
viewing the history of governmental immunity for injuries arising out
of military service;40 then outlining the development of the post-service
tort, with an explanation of its modem definitions. This comment will
also demonstrate that the post-service tort is compatible with the ra-
tionale used for military immunity by analyzing the post-service tort
under the test expressed by the United States Supreme Court. Policy
factors that support the acceptance of this theory will also be dis-
cussed. 4 1 Finally, this comment will argue that the post-service tort
should be accepted by the courts to prevent similar post-service injuries
to servicemen in the future and insure that timely follow-up care is
provided in similar situations.
THE HISTORY OF GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY FOR TORT DAMAGES
ARISING OUT OF MILITARY SERVICE
In 1946 the Federal Tort Claims Act42 (hereinafter referred to as the
F.T.C.A.) stripped the United States government of sovereign immu-
nity. The F.T.C.A. gives the federal courts subject matter jurisdiction
over claims for injuries caused by the negligent or wrongful act or
omission of any government employee. 3 The government employee
must be acting in the scope of his employment and under circum-
stances where a private person would be liable in accordance with the
laws of the place where the act occurred.' Thus, if a private person
would be liable to suit, so will the United States government. The
F.T.C.A. provides for statutory immunity from any claims that arise in
a foreign country and claims that arise out of combat.45 The F.T.C.A.
does not, however, contain any provision that specifies its application
or non-application to a member of the armed forces in other than com-
bat situations.46 The congressional debates concerning the F.T.C.A.
contain no language upon which servicemen can base tort claims.47
The F.T.C.A. was therefore left to judicial interpretation. Generally it
39. Id; see also 492 F. Supp. at 325.
40. Governmental immunity will be referred to as military immunity, although it is actually
governmental immunity for injuries which arise out of military service.
41. See generally Comment, Dut' to Warn as an Inroad to the Feres Doctrine: A Theory of
Tort Jecoveryfor the Veteran, 43 OHIo LJ. 267 (1982) (general discussion of the same topic).
42. 28 U.S.C. §§2671-2680 (1976).
43. Id
44. Id §1346(b).
45. Id §2680G), (k).
46. "No Federal law recognizes a recovery such as the claimants seek." Feres v. United
States, 340 U.S. 135, 144 (1950).
47. Id. at 138.
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has been liberally interpreted in favor of governmental liability.48
However, four years after the F.T.C.A. was enacted the Supreme Court
created one broad exception to governmental liability-governmentalimmunity for claims arising out of military service. In Feres v. United
States,49 Justice Jackson, writing for the majority, held that "the gov-
ernment is not liable for injuries to servicemen where the injuries arise
out of, or are in, the course of an activity incident to service."5 Feres, a
serviceman, died in a barracks fire caused by the negligent mainte-
nance of a heater.'
The Feres doctrine has been criticized by many courts and commen-
tators. 2 Some critics have advocated abolition of the doctrine because
of the possibility of unfair results by allowing minimal recovery of vet-
erans benefits in cases where injuries have been severe or intentional.
5 3
Yet despite this criticism, in the thirty-two years since Feres was de-
cided,54 Congress has not altered the statute and the courts have been
forced to uphold governmental immunity."
During the 1960's and 1970's, governmental liability was expanded
by the courts to allow recovery in many areas. 6 The door was
slammed on military liability, however, in 1977 when the Supreme
Court decided Stencel v. United States17 which reaffirmed Feres.5"
Since the Feres and Stencel decisions, veterans and servicemen have
been forced to develop new legal theories to avoid the harsh result im-
posed by military irmunity.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THEORIES USED TO AVOID
MILITARY IMMUNITY
Many theories have been used and rejected in an attempt to circum-
vent the Feres doctrine. One of the first theories to become judicially
48. See Id at 138. See generally Note, From Feres to Stencel: Should Military Personnel
Have Access to FCA Recovery? 77 MICH. L. REv. 1099 (1979) (contains a general discussion of
the FTCA and military immunity).
49. 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
50. Id at 146.
51. Id
52. See Jaffee v. United States, 663 F.2d 1226, 1228-29 (3rd Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct.
2234 (1982). See generally Peluso v. United States, 474 F.2d 605 (3rd Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 879 (1973) (three justices dissenting); Thornwell, 471 F. Supp. 344; De Dominicis, supra note
4, at 30. The above authorities criticize the Feres doctrine because of possible unjust results.
53. See supra note 52.
54. See, eg., 663 F.2d at 1247.
55. See Broudy v. United States, 661 F.2d 125, 127 (9th Cir. 1981); Stanley v. CIA, 639 F.2d
1146, 1152 (5th Cir. 1979).
56. See, e.g., United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 340 U.S. 543, 550 (1950); United States v.
Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co., 338 U.S. 366, 383 (1949).
57. 431 U.S. 666 (1977).
58. The court prohibited a third party claim for the faulty design of an ejection system which
caused permanent injuries to a serviceman. Id at 669.
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recognized was stated in Brooks v. United States. 9 While on furlough
from the army, Brooks was driving on a public highway and was hit by
a military vehicle.60 The court nevertheless determined that Brooks'
injuries were only remotely related to his military duty and therefore
allowed recovery.61 It must be noted that the Brooks cause of action
only allows recovery in rare situations when the government is some-
how at fault but the negligence is not related to military duty.62 Veter-
ans who have been exposed to toxic substances have not recovered
under this theory.63  The courts have reasoned that exposure to the
radiation and Agent Orange occurred during military duty and thus
was service related.6
Veterans have also attempted to avoid Feres by bringing a cause of
action against individual officers and Defense Department officials al-
leging that these individuals denied the veterans their constitutional
rights by exposing them to dangerous substances without notice.65 This
theory has also been unsuccessful. 66 The courts have denied recovery
under the constitution, stating that this basis for recovery would inter-
fere with the jurisdiction and procedure of the V.A. and the important
military function of protecting the country.67
Recently the Supreme Court denied certiorari in Jaffee v. United
States68 in which the serviceman sought recovery for cancer caused by
exposure to radiation. The claims were based on constitutional viola-
tions.69 In Jaffee the Court held that a soldier did not have a cause of
action directly under the Constitution against the United States govern-
ment and various named individuals for knowingly, deliberately, and
recklessly disregarding the knowledge that they were exposing plaintiff
to a grave risk of injury by compelling him to participate in a radiation
test of a nuclear device.7 The court reasoned that the plaintiff had a
59. 337 U.S. 49 (1949).
60. Id at 50; see United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110, 114 (1954) (the court distinguished
Brooks thus not overruling it); Comment, supra note 41, at 270.
61. The Supreme Court allowed Brooks who was a serviceman to recover damages minus his
V.A. compensation benefits stating that because he was not on duty at the time of the injury, the
injury was only remotely related to military service and not barred by Feres. 337 U.S. at 52-53.
62. Id at 50.
63. See, e.g., Thornwell, 471 F. Supp. at 348; Everette v. United States, 492 F. Supp. 318, 320-
22 (S.D. Ohio 1980).
&. See Lombard v. United States, 530 F. Supp. 918, 921 (D.D.C. 1981); Kelley v. United
States, 512 F. Supp. 356, 361-62 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
65. The court applied the Feres doctrine to a veterans claim of constitutional violations for
intentionally exposing him to radiation. Jaffee v. United States, 663 F.2d 1226, 1228 (3rd Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 2234 (1982); see also 471 F. Supp. at 353.
66. See Ryan v. Cleveland, 531 F. Supp. 724, 730-33 (E.D.N.Y. 1982).
67. Id at 733-34.
68. 663 F.2d 1226 (3rd Cir. 1981) cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 2234 (1982).
69. Id at 1243.
70. Id
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claim under the Veterans Benefits Act71 which precluded other recov-
ery. Further, the court stated that if it allowed suits under this cause of
action it would affect military decisions and military discipline.72 The
refusal of the Supreme Court to hear the Jaffee case leaves the accept-
ance of damages for constitutional violations in radiation cases an open
issue.
Veterans have also sought tort recovery for children born with ge-
netic defects allegedly caused by their father's exposure to radiation or
Agent Orange during his military service.73 The federal courts are split
in this area; the Ninth Circuit has denied recovery74 but the Eastern
District for Pennsylvania has allowed recovery.75 In Hinkie v. United
States76 the District Court of Pennsylvania analyzed the claim of the
chromosome damaged child under the criteria for allowing recovery
outlined in Feres and Stencel and determined that the instant cause of
action complied with the requirements of the two earlier cases.77 The
court stated that the child's claim was not incident to service nor deriv-
ative of the serviceman's claim78 and that therefore, recovery should be
allowed.7 9 In contrast, in Monaco v. United States,"° the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals reluctantly denied the damaged child's claim even
though she was unable to collect under the Veterans Benefits Act.8'
The court determined that allowing the child a cause of action would
cause the court to examine military decisions, exactly what Feres
sought to avoid.8 2
Another theory used by veterans to overcome military immunity is
the post-service tort, a variation of the reasoning used in Brooks and
expanded by Brown v. United States."3 Judicial definition and accept-
ance of the post-service tort will be the topic of the remainder of this
comment.8 4
71. Id at 1231-33.
72. Id
73. See Monaco v. United States, 661 F.2d 129, 130 (9th Cir. 1981); Hinkie v. United States,
524 F. Supp. 277, 279 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
74. See 661 F.2d at 134 (denying recovery).
75. See 524 F. Supp. at 279, 282 (allowing recovery).
76. 524 F. Supp. 277 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
77. See Id at 283.
78. See Id at 281-83.
79. See Id at 284.
80. 661 F.2d 129 (9th Cir. 1979).
81. Id at 134.
82. Id
83. 348 U.S. 110 (1954).
84. See Comment, supra note 41 (general discussion of the same topic).
Pacfc Law Journal / Vol 14
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE POST-SERVICE TORT
A. History of the Post-Service Tort Claim
The post-service tort claim is a claim for damages caused by post-
service military negligence; 5 the claim is for injuries which were caused
after86 discharge even though the original injury occurred during serv-
ice, therefore, recovery is not barred by the Feres doctrine.87
The first case to allow recovery based on the occurrence of the tort
after service was Brown v. United States.88 Brown, a serviceman, was
injured while on military duty.89 After his discharge Brown was
treated at a V.A. hospital.90 The V.A. doctor negligently injured
Brown during surgery.9 Brown sued the government for the injuries
caused by the post-service surgery.92 The Supreme Court allowed
Brown to recover for the injuries caused by the doctor after discharge
even though the injury that made surgery necessary occurred during
active military duty.93 The Brown case is not only important because it
allowed recovery for a post-service injury which originated during serv-
ice, but also because it distinguished Brooks from Feres by holding that
injuries not arising out of military service are not barred by Feres.94
The United States Supreme Court also ruled that a veteran can collect
both V.A. benefits for his in-service injury and damages in tort under
the F.T.C.A. for injuries caused by the government's, negligence which
occured after discharge.
95
In Schwartz v. United States,96 ten years after Brown, the United
States District Court in Pennsylvania awarded $725,000 under the
F.T.C.A. to a veteran for injuries suffered due to medical malpractice
occurring after his discharge.97 Schwartz, while in the service, submit-
ted to X-rays in order to determine the cause of his breathing
problems.98 During the X-ray a radioactive dye, known to be danger-
ous, was inserted in his sinus and never removed.9 9 Schwartz returned
to V.A. hospitals many times and because the doctors never sent for
85. See Everette v. United States, 492 F. Supp. 318, 326 (S.D. Ohio 1980).
86. Id
87. Id
88. 348 U.S. 110 (1954).




93. Id at 112-113.
94. Id
95. Id at 113.
96. 230 F. Supp. 536 (E.D. Pa. 1964).
97. Id at 543.
98. Id at 537.
99. Id at 538.
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Schwartz's medical records, the dye was not found.' 0 The dye caused
cancer and a portion of Schwartz's face was removed.' In holding the
government liable, the court noted that the actionable negligence was
not the original insertion of the dye used for X-rays which occurred
during the veteran's military service.0 2 Rather, the liability was im-
posed because the military had a duty to seek out this type of patient
and warn him of this danger.1
0 3
In Toal v. UnitedStates,""° the Second Circuit followed Schwartz by
allowing recovery for a post-service tort. The court held that the failure
of a doctor to file a notation in Toars medical records regarding his
treatment with a radioactive dye caused the dye to go unnoticed after
Toal's discharge resulting in brain damage. 0 5 Recovery was allowed
for the failure to warn Toal of the presence of the dye after
discharge.
10 6
B. The Post-Service Tort is Expanded Beyond Mapractice Claims
The first nonmedical malpractice claim to apply the post-service tort
was Thornwell v. United States.0 7 This case brought to the attention of
the public the use of servicemen as human "guinea pigs". Thomwell,
an army private stationed in Germany, was injected with L.S.D. for the
purpose of determining the utility of this drug during interrogation. 08
The military never informed Thornwell of the injection."0 9 Since the
L.S.D. injection, Thornwell has suffered serious mental illness and se-
vere physical pain. I" Moreover, he has been unable to carry on a nor-
mal life."' Thornwell did not discover he had been injected with
L.S.D. until seventeen years later. 2 Thornwell sought recovery based
on the failure of the government to provide follow up medical treat-
ment and failure to inform him after his discharge that he had been
given L.S.D. during his military service." 3 The court held that recov-
ery for post-discharge injuries was not only consistent with Feres but
100. Id
101. Id at 539.
102. Id at 540.
103. Id
104. A veteran was allowed recovery when the military doctor assured him that the radioac-
tive dye used for x-rays need not be removed and later lodged in his brain causing damage. Toal
v. United States, 438 F.2d 222, 225 (2nd Cir. 1971).
105. 438 F.2d at 225.
106. Id
107. 471 F. Supp. 344 (D.D.C. 1979).





113. Id at 349.
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"compelled by Brown." 1 4  Although Mr. Thornwell learned that he
was harmed during active duty, there was a separate tort after dis-
.charge, for failure to rescue Thornwell from the danger created by the
government.'1 5 The court recognized a cause of action for this separate
tort of failure to warn and stated that Thornwell could recover to the
extent that the failure to warn aggravated or prolonged his
condition.
16
C. The Limiting of Thornwell
Since Thornwell, veterans have attempted to rely on that case as pre-
cedent to recover for injuries caused by exposure to radiation, Agent
Orange, and mustard gas."17 Some courts have distinguished the partic-
ular cases on the facts."18 Many courts require the in-service tort to be
intentional 11 while other courts have rejected the post-service tort for a
variety of reasons.' 20 There does not seem to be any consensus among
the courts as to the scope or limitation of Thornwell.
1. 4cceptance of the Post-Service Tort if the Original
Tort is Intentional'
2 1
In Thornwell, the in-service tort of injecting the L.S.D. was inten-
tional; however, the court stated that when the military performed two
negligent acts, one during service and one after discharge, a veteran
may recover for the later negligent act.12 2 This language clearly indi-
cates that the first act does not have to be intentional. 23 Nevertheless,
some courts have interpreted this holding as requiring the in-service
tort to be intentional. 24 In Stanley v. CA. ,125 the Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals held that the plaintiff failed to allege an intentional in-ser-
114. Id Like the plaintiff in Brown, Mr. Thornwell was a civilian at the time defendants
allegedly failed to provide him with adequate care and treatment and thus, under Brown he has
stated the elements of a valid claim. Id at 349-50.
115. Id at 352; see Comment, supra note 41, at 267.
116. Id at 352-53. Thornwell alleged since his discharge four months after the L.S.D. experi-
ment he has suffered and continues to suffer serious mental and physical illnesses and that he has
been unable to maintain any job and that he is an emotional cripple. Id at 346-47.
117. See supra notes 3, 4.
118. Seesupra note 64.
119. See, eg., Stanley v. CIA, 639 F.2d 1146, 1153-54 (5th Cir. 1981); Kelley v. United States,
512 F. Supp. 356, 360-61 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
120. See, e.g., Sweet v. United States, 528 F. Supp. 1065, 1073-74 (S.D. 1981); Schnurman v.
United States, 490 F. Supp. 429, 436-37 (E.D. Va. 1980).
121. Intentional as used in this comment refers to the situations in which the military exposed
servicemen to radiation aware of the possible harm it could cause.
122. Thornwell v. United States, 471 F. Supp. 344, 352-53 (D.D.C. 1979).
123. Id
124. See, e.g., 639 F.2d at 1153-54; Lombard v. United States, 530 F. Supp. 918, 920 (D.D.C.
1981).
125. 639 F.2d 1146 (5th Cir. 1981).
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vice tort and therefore did not state a cause of action under Thornwell,
even though the facts of the case were similar. 126 In Sweet v. United
States 27 a United States District Court for South Dakota also stated
on facts similar to Thornwell, that intent was required, however, the
case was dismissed because the plaintiff failed to meet the statute of
limitations. 128 In Schnurman v. United States,2 the United States Dis-
trict Court, Eastern District in Virginia stated that no recovery would
be allowed because the in-service tort was not intentional; this case was
also dismissed because of the statute of limitations. 30 In Lombard v.
United States 3' the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals denied recovery
to a veteran because his exposure to radiation was in the course of duty
and not intentional. 132 Veterans' claims for injuries allegedly caused
by exposure to Agent Orange have also been denied because the expo-
sure was unintentional. 133 The courts have stated that the purpose of
using Agent Orange was not to experiment but rather to defoliate the
jungle which was a proper military motive.1
34
2. Some Courts Have Rejected the Post-Service Tort
Some courts have distinguished the facts of a particular case before
them from Thornwell, classifying the tort as a continuous one and thus
rejecting the post-service tort 35 theory. Courts taking this approach
have based their decision on the fact that the plaintiffs remained in the
service for a period of time after the first tort occurred, 136 thus, the
second tort, the failure to warn the serviceman, was held to be merely a
continuance of the first tort.
1 37
Several cases have departed from the holding of Thornwell on facts
126. Recovery was denied when a volunteer was injected with L.S.D. and has since suffered
psychological problems. Id at 1148.
127. 528 F. Supp. 1068 (D.S.D. 1981) (voluntarily participated in L.S.D. experiments and
since then has suffered nervous spells).
128. Id at 1073-74.
129. 490 F. Supp. 429 (E.D. Va. 1980). Plaintiff voluntarily participated in an experiment to
test protective clothing and was exposed to mustard gas and was never informed of the injuries it
could cause. Plaintiff has suffered a variety of ailments since then. Id at 431-32.
130. Id at 435.
131. 530 F. Supp. 918 (D.D.C. 1981). The Thornwel case was also decided in the District of
Columbia so it would seem that the court has interpreted Thornwell as requiring the original tort
to be intentional.
132. Id at 920-21; Lombard was exposed to radiation while handling and transporting radio-
active equipment. Id at 919.
133. See In re Agent Orange Litigation, 506 F. Supp. 762, 777.
134. Id at 779.
135. Stanley v. CIA, 639 F.2d 1146, 1154 (5th Cir. 1981).
136. See Stanley v. CIA, 639 F.2d 1146, 1149 (5th Cir. 1981) (remained in the service eleven
years after the experiment); Fountain v. United States, 533 F. Supp. 698, 700 (W.D. Ark. 1981)
(remained in the service eight years after exposure). But cf. Kelley v. United States, 512 F. Supp.
356 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (interprets the tort as: beginning immediately after exposure and denies
recovery).
137. See supra note 125.
Pacflc Law Journal / Vol 14
so similar to Thornwell that their holdings impliedly or expressly reject
the post-service tort. In Laswell v. Brown 8 the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals has expressly rejected the post-service tort.139 Laswell, during
service in the Navy, was stationed off Eniwetok Atoll.140 He observed
three atomic explosions from his ship.' 4' After the third explosion he
was ordered to participate in the construction of an airstrip less than
one mile from the blast sight.142 Laswell alleged that while building
the airstrip, he was exposed to radiation. 14  Laswell was diagnosed as
having Hodgkins disease caused by exposure to low level radiation. l'
The disease ultimately caused his death in 1979. 14 The court rejected
the post-service tort using the rationale of Feres.146 The United States
District Court, Eastern District of Pennsylvania also followed Laswell
in Kelley v. United States.147  The court, however, did not expressly
reject the post-service tort.148 Kelley was exposed to radiation while
stationed in the South Pacific during atomic testing and developed can-
cer as a result of the exposure. 149 The court refused to find a separate
tort for the failure to warn, stating that it found no difference in the
failure to warn Kelley before he was exposed and the failure to warn
him after discharge."' The court in Kelley avoided express rejection of
the post-service tort by finding that Kelley did not allege a similar post-
service tort.'5' The Schnurman case also interpreted the original tort as
a continuous one and analogized the facts to two medical malpractice
cases where the courts refused-to- find two separate torts.152 Despite the
narrow interpretation or rejection by the federal court of Schwartz and
Thornwell, two recent decisions have given a post-service tort claim to
veterans.
138. 524 F. Supp. 847, 848 (W.D. Mo. 1981) affd 683 F.2d 261 (1982). Plaintiff died of Hodg-
kins disease caused by radiation exposure.
139. 524 F. Supp. 847, affd 683 F.2d 261 (1982) "The court declines to follow Jafee,
Thornwell, and Everette to the extent they are inconsistent with this opinion." Id at 850.






146. Id at 850.
147. 512 F. Supp. 356 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
148. "Having reviewed the precedent to date, like the Fifth Circuit in Stanley, I see no need to
reach the issue of whether Thornwell and Everette were correctly decided." Id at 360.
149. Id at 357.
150. Id at 360-61.
151. Id at 360.
152. See generally Henning v. United States, 446 F.2d 774 (3rd-Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 1016 (1972) (failure to inform a veteran of the true content of x-rays which had been taken
while he was on active duty); Wisniewski v. United States, 599 F. Supp. 559 (E.D. Wis. 1976)
(failure to provide him either before or after discharge with the results of a blood test taken while
he was in the service) In these cases the court refused to find two separate torts and applied the
Feres doctrine to prevent recovery.
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3. Current Acceptance of the Post-Service Tort
The two most recent cases allowing a post-service tort cause of action
involved veterans who have contracted cancer allegedly due to their
exposure to radiation during military service.153 In Everette v. United
States,'54 the United States District Court, Southern District of Ohio,
granted a cause of action for damages brought about by the military's
failure to warn Mr. Everette after he left the military of the harmful
effects that exposure to radiation during military service could cause.
155
The action was brought by his spouse against the United States to re-
cover for Mr. Everette's wrongful death. 156 Mr. Everette was exposed to
radiation when he was ordered to march through a nuclear blast area
less than one hour after detonation of an atomic bomb.1 57 Mrs. Eve-
rette's complaint alleged that the exposure was intentional and caused
cancer.' 58 The court admitted the possibility that the purpose of the
exposure was to determine what effect an atomic explosion would have
on the troops but nonetheless held that the failure to inform Everette of
his exposure to radiation was a separate tort for which he could
recover. 159
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals took a different approach in
Broudy v. United States. ' 0 The court granted a limited cause of action
to a wife whose husband died from a form of cancer that has been
linked to low level radiation. 61 Major Broudy was ordered to partici-
pate in maneuvers in the vicinity of at least two atomic bomb explo-
sions.1 62 The complaint alleged that the maneuvers were conducted for
the express purpose of studying how well troops could withstand an
atomic blast.1 63 Major Broudy was never informed of the dangers asso-
ciated with radiation.'" The court held that Major Broudy's wife
could recover damages only if she could prove that the military learned
of the dangers of radiation after he was discharged and that the failure
of the military to warn him caused further injury.165 This novel hold-
ing makes recovery dependent on whether or not the military was
153. See Everette v. United States, 492 F. Supp. 318, 319-20 (S.D. Ohio 1980).
154. 492 F. Supp. 318 (S.D. Ohio 1980).
155. Id at 326.
156. Id at 320.
157. Id
158. Id at 319.
159. Id at 320, 326.
160. 661 F.2d 125 (9th Cir. 1981).




165. Id at 129.
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aware of the danger during the time the plaintiff served. 66 The Broudy
holding implies that regardless of military awareness of danger at the
time of exposure, and regardless of military failure to warn after dis-
charge, the veteran may not recover unless exposure to the substance
was negligent, that is, the military was not aware of the dangerous na-
ture of the substance until after discharge.' 67 Broudy creates the anom-
alous situation of allowing recovery only where negligence on the part
of the military can be proven after discharge. Intentional exposure to
dangerous substances for testing purposes seems to be condoned.1
68
This holding is a departure from the post-service tort as defined in
Thornwell and Everette because the military has a duty to warn a vet-
eran what he has been exposed to during service even if the military
was aware of the danger at the time of exposure.1
69
. Current State of the Law
Under the current state of the law there are three points of view con-
cerning the post-service tort: (1) recovery should be allowed if the orig-
inal tort is intentional; 70 (2) recovery should be allowed only if the
government learned of the possible harm to the serviceman after dis-
charge;' 7' and (3) recovery under a post-service tort theory should not
be allowed.
172
Only the Broudy and Laswell cases have reached the appellate level
creating uncertainty of the law in the federal courts. If a forum has not
decided the issue, a veteran should use inconsistent pleading when
bringing a claim based on the post-service tort theory.' 73 A veteran
bringing suit should be able to allege that the government knowingly
and intentionally exposed him to a toxic substance and that further, the
government was negligent in failing to warn him after discharge of the
known harmful effects of the substance. This should bring the plaintiff
under Everette. Alternatively, to come under Broudy, the veteran
should be able to allege that the government exposed him to a sub-
stance and that after his discharge the government learned of its dan-




169. See Id at 128-29.
170. Everette v. United States, 492 F. Supp. 318 (S.D. Ohio 1980) (original tort intentional).
171. 661 F.2d 125 (recovery only if the government becomes aware of the danger after
discharge).
172. Laswell v. Brown, 524 F. Supp. 847, 849-50 (W.D. Mo. 1981) (no post-service tort).
173. Broudy seems to only allow recovery if the government learns of the dangers of radiation
after discharge. This indicates that the government would not be liable under Thornwell if the
government knowingly exposed a soldier to radiation and then failed to warn him afterwards.
However, the case has not been tried as of the writing of this article.
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the cause of his injuries. No matter which approach is taken by a court,
Everette, Broudy, or a new theory, it must not contradict the reasons
given by the Supreme Court for upholding military immunity.174
THE POST-SERVICE TORT IS CONSISTENT WITH THE COURT CREATED
RATIONALE FOR MILITARY IMMUNITY
The Supreme Court has chosen to treat the military differently than
any other governmental agency by not allowing governmental liability
under the F.T.C.A.1 75 The court has upheld the Feres doctrine of mili-
tary immunity for several reasons: the absence of analogous liability in
similar circumstances; the special relationship between the military and
the government; the effect suits would have on the maintenance of dis-
cipline; the unfairness of permitting service related claims for damages
to be determined by laws differing from state to state; and the existence
of a comprehensive statutory system of compensation benefits.
1 76
Courts have interpreted these analyses differently, and the Supreme
Court has abandoned some of the reasons offered and emphasized
others.' 77 Twenty-seven years after Feres, the Supreme Court used ba-
sically the same framework in the decision reached in Stencel v. United
States.'78 The Court analyzed the facts of Stencel to determine if
granting recovery would interfere with the military in the ways that the
Feres court sought to avoid. 179 When analyzed in light of Feres, the
post-service tort does not conflict with any of the reasons expressed by
the Court for upholding military immunity.' 80 This comment will
demonstrate that none of the rationale expressed in Feres will be abro-
gated by allowing recovery under a post-service tort theory and there-
fore this theory should be accepted by the courts.
A. Absence of Private Liabiliy in Similar Circumstances
The United States Supreme Court has retreated from the position
that there must be private liability in similar circumstances, before gov-
ernmental liability can be found. 81  In Indian Towing v. United
174. Stencel v. United States, 431 U.S. 666, 670 (1977). "It is necessary, therefore, to examine
the rationale of Feres to determine to what extent, if any, allowance of petitioners claim would
circumvent the purposes of the Act as construed by the court." Id at 670; See Comment, supra
note 41, at 278-80.
175. See Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 141-43 (1950).
176. Seeld at 141-43.
177. See Note, supra note 48, at 1102-12.
178. See 431 U.S. 666, 670-74 (discusses Feres and the problems it sought to avoid).
179. See Stencel v. United States, 431 U.S. 666, 672-73 (1977); Comment, supra note 41, at
270.
180. See Comment, supra note 41, at 278-79.
181. See L. JAYSON, HANDLING FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS 5-89 (1967).
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States"'82 the Court allowed recovery for the government's negligent
maintenance of a light house even though maintaining lighthouses is
solely a governmental function.18 3 Subsequently, in Rayonier v. United
States,'"84 a case involving negligence of federal firefighters, the Court
rejected the argument that because private citizens do not engage in a
type of activity, no governmental liability should be allowed.' 8 In
United States v. Muniz,18 6 claims by federal prisoners against the gov-
ernment were allowed.' 87 The Court held that liability may be im-
posed on the United States under the F.T.C.A. even though under state
law both the state and the jailer would be immune from a similar
suit.' 88 These cases indicate that the Supreme Court is willing to hold
the government liable in situations where the government alone en-
gages in the activity giving rise to the suit and there is no comparable
private liability. In Stencel, the most recent case to consider military
immunity, the court alluded to this factor but did not rely on the ab-
sence of private liability for the holding.'8 9 As a result of Rayonier,
Indian Towing, and Stencel, this portion of the Feres doctrine is no
longer a necessary factor.' 90 Therefore, merely because the federal
government has the exclusive privilege to raise an army, and there
would therefore be no analogous private liability, recovery should not
be precluded.' 91
B. The Special Relationship Between the Military
and the Government
The second factor relied upon by the Feres Court was the relation-
ship between a sovereign and the members of its armed forces being
unlike any relationship existing between private individuals.192 This is
the most substantial argument used in maintaining military immunity
and the one that was recently emphasized in Stencel 93 Some authors
believed that this factor had been narrowly construed to forbid only
causes of action that would interfere with military discipline.' 94  In
Stencel however, the Court analyzed the facts in light of the fear of
182. 350 U.S. 61 (1955).
183. See Id at 64-65.
184. 352 U.S. 315 (1956).
185. Id at 318-19.
186. 374 U.S. 150 (1963).
187. (d at 152.
188. See Jayson, supa note 181, at 5-89.
189. See Stencel v. United States, 431 U.S. 666, 671-73 (1977).
190. JAYSON, supra note 181, at 5-89.
191. Id
192. See Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 141-42 (1950).
193. See 431 U.S. at 672.
194. Note, supra note 47 at 1111.
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interference with military discipline as well as the distinct relationship
existing between the military and the government. 95 Use of these fac-
tors to analyze the post-service tort demonstrates that the post-service
tort is compatible with the concerns of the Supreme Court in preserving
government immunity. 196 In Stencel the Court stated that the armed
services perform a unique nationwide function of protecting the United
States and that there are significant risks in that undertaking. 197 The
Court would not interfere with military autonomy in carrying out the
function of protecting the country by allowing recovery for the failure
to provide follow up care or for failing to inform a veteran of the harm-
ful substances he had been exposed to during his military service. 98
Liability would only be imposed for governmental negligence after the
soldier is discharged from the military. 199 The plaintiff would then be a
civilian at the time of the wrong2°° and the judges would not be second-
guessing military orders in the field as feared by the Court in Feres.2 °'
The government would merely have a duty to rescue a veteran from his
position of danger after discharge.
Moreover, this type of recovery would not disrupt military discipline
as feared by the courts.20 2 Failure to warn after service is a separate
tort occurring after discharge; military decisions made during service
would not be questioned.20 3 As in the Brown case, the act in question
would occur after discharge, therefore the post-service tort does not in-
volve negligent orders or negligent acts committed in the course of mil-
itary duty.2 4 The duty of informing veterans of their exposure to
substances would be an administrative procedure that could be imple-
mented through the V.A.. This duty would not involve daily military
command decisions nor battlefield discipline, but rather, only decisions
relating to veterans after their discharge.
Everette, Broudy, and Thornwell are all similar to Brown since recov-
ery was allowed even though the original tort occurred during service.
195. See 431 U.S. at 672-73.
196. See Comment, supra note 41, at 279-80.
197. Id at 672. Justice Marshall along with Justice Brennan, who joined in his dissent, under-
mined this rationale by noting that many federal agencies perform unique, nationwide functions
and yet liability under the FTCA had not impaired their efficiency. Id at 675 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
198. See Comment, supra note 41, at 279-80.
199. See Everette v. United States, 492 F. Supp. 318, 326 (E.D. Va. 1980); Thornwell v. United
States, 471 F. Supp. 344, 353 (D.D.C. 1979).
200. See United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110, 112. Plaintiff was a civilian at the time of his
injuries and his injuries did not arise out of service; Id at 113; See generally Bankston v. United
States, 480 F.2d 495 (5th Cir. 1973) (remanded to determine if plaintiff had been discharged at the
time of malpractice).
201. See Feres, 340 U.S. at 141-142.
202. See 492 F. Supp. at 321; 471 F. Supp. at 351.
203. See 492 F. Supp. at 321; 471 F. Supp. at 351.
204. See Comment, supra note 41, at 280-81.
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In Brown the Supreme Court stated that no threat to military discipline
was imposed since the claim was brought by a discharged veteran. 0 5
-Conscience dictates that when servicemen are used as human guinea
pigs or sprayed with a chemical that later is discovered to be highly
toxic, the government, at the very least, should have a duty to inform
the veteran of the peril.2 °6 This slight infringement on military auton-
omy would not prevent the military from performing its "unique func-
tion" of national defense. In the past, the courts have infringed on
military autonomy when the rights of servicemen were receiving less
protection than a court would provide and the judicial infringement on
military discipline and autonomy was not great.20 7 Military jurisdic-
tion was thus reduced in Toth v. Quarles2 8 when the United States
Supreme Court struck down court-martial jurisdiction over veterans
accused of serious crimes committed while on active duty.20 9 The
Court reasoned that since Toth was discharged, the military's need for
jurisdiction was not great enough to justify the abridgement of personal
rights entailed by military jurisdiction.2"0 The Court again cut back
military jurisdiction over active personnel when it held that if an al-
leged crime of an active duty member of the armed forces is not "serv-
ice connected," no military necessity exists to justify military
jurisdiction.2 I
The type of recovery the post-service tort allows would comport with
the reasoning used by the Court in reducing military jurisdiction be-
cause it would not allow scrutiny of military decisions; rather, recovery
is allowed only for injuries sustained after discharge.212 In cases where
servicemen have been exposed to toxic substances and the government
has failed to inform them, judicial interference is justified in order to
allow compensation for a grievous wrong.213
C. The Unfairness Factor
Both Feres and Stencel stressed the unfairness of exposing military
205. See 348 U.S. at 112.
206. See Comment, supra note 41, at 280-81.
207. See, e.g., O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 266-67 (1969) (the court cut back military
jurisdiction for alleged crimes during active duty when the crimes were not service related); Muniz
v. United States, 374 U.S. 150, 165 (1963) (the court allowed federal prisoners to recover who had
been injured due to negligence of federal employees because the claim would not interfere with
prison discipline).
208. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1950).
209. Id at 21-22.
210. Id
211. See O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 266-67 (1969); For a general discussion on this
subject, see Note, supra note 47, at 1114-1115.
212. See Brown v. United States, 348 U.S. 110, 112 (1954).
213. See Comment, supra note 41, at 281.
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personnel to varying laws and standards of care as provided by the
F.T.C.A. when recovery is allowed under the law of the state where the
tort occurs.2 14 It is important to note that the Supreme Court did not
mention this as a factor when allowing recovery in Brown.215  This
omission is most likely because Brown was a civilian at the time the
tort occurred.216 As stated previously, the post-service tort under either
definition allows recovery only for the damages caused after service
when the veteran has a civilian status.21 7 Therefore, the fairness factor
should not be used as a rationale in denying recovery grounded on the
post-service tort. As the Supreme Court later stated in United States v.
M4uni, 218 it is more unfair to deny recovery at all than to be concerned
with the mere application of nonuniform state laws.219 Courts have ra-
tionalized the need of a uniform set of laws to govern military activities
on the basis that the military performs the vital task of protecting the
country.22°
Local tort law, however, is routinely applied to the armed forces de-
spite this concern.221 The armed forces are subject to diverse standards
of care and liability when they are in contact with civilians, dependents
living on military bases, public carriers, military physicians, and mili-
tary hospitals. 2 Since a veteran is free to go where he chooses, the
rationale that state laws are not uniform and therefore unfair to a ser-
viceman who has no control over his location should not be a-barrier to
the acceptance of the post-service tort. The only factor remaining in
the Feres doctrine that could prevent the acceptance of the post-service
tort is the existence of statutory compensation for service related
injuries.
D. The Existence of a Statutory System of Compensation
Beginning with Feres, the courts have consistently denied tort recov-
ery for service related injuries relying on the "simple, sure and uniform
remedy" supposedly provided by the Veterans Compensation Stat-
ute.223 The Veterans Compensation Statutes provide statutory benefits
for veterans who have been injured during service. 24 In Stencel, the
214. Stencel v. United States, 431 U.S. 666, 672 (1977); Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135,
143 (1950).
215. See 348 U.S. at 112.
216. Id
217. See supra note 3.
218. 374 US. 150 (1963).
219. Id at 162.
220. See 431 U.S. at 672.
221. Note, supra note 48, at 1120-21.
222. Id
223. 340 U.S. at 144.
224. Id
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Court stated that statutory benefits were supposed to place an upper
limit on recovery, however, the statute itself does not state this. 225 In
Brown and the earlier Brooks case, the United States Supreme Court
held that a veteran may recover under the F.T.C.A. for an injury sus-
tained even though he was entitled to, and did receive, veteran's disa-
bility payments.226  In Brown the Court reaffirmed Brooks and
distinguished the case from Feres227 holding that in situations in which
the injury is unrelated to a person's service or occurred after his mili-
tary discharge, veterans compensation did not preclude tort recovery
and the'veteran's compensation payments could be subtracted from the
tort award.228 As stated previously, the post-service tort theory is an
extension of the holdings in Brooks and Brown . 2 29 The theory is simi-
lar to Brown in that recovery sought is for injuries occurring after serv-
ice.23 Therefore, as in Brown, the availability of veterans,
compensation should not bar recovery for injuries incurred after
231service.
It is also important to note that veterans compensation is not a cer-
tain remedy.232 Furthermore, unlike worker's compensation benefits,
veteran's benefits have been considered a mere gratuity that can be re-
voked for a variety of reasons.233 Therefore, veterans benefits are not
compensating veterans exposed to radiation who have contracted can-
cer234 as only sixteen veterans have been awarded benefits.235 More-
over, these claimants are only entitled to receive $1,130 per month and
their widows may receive only $500.236 This low rate of V.A. recovery
is attributed to the fact that it is difficult to prove that radiation expo-
sure caused the cancer.237 The causation problem, combined with the
225. 431 U.S. at 672-73; see 340 U.S. at 113; 38 U.S.C. §§I-5228 (1976).
226. Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49, 53 (1949) "We will not call either remedy in the
present case exclusive, nor pronounce a doctrine of election of remedies, when Congress has not
done so." 1d; see also Note, supra note 48, at 1108-9.
227. See 348 U.S. at 112-13.
228. 1d at 113.
229. See supra notes 88-96 and accompanying text.
230. Thornwell, 471 F. Supp. at 349-50.
231. 348 U.S. at 113.
232. See Silberschein v. United States, 226 U.S. 221, 225 (1924) (benefits considered a
gratuity).
233. Veterans benefits can be forfeited temporarily during imprisonment, 38 U.S.C. §505(a)
(1976), for conviction of sabotage, Id §3504(a), or subversive activities, Id §3505, and a veteran
will not receive benefits if discharge was for reasons other than honorable. d §331; see Note,
supra note 48, at 1107-08.
234. See De Dominicis, supra note 4, at 31.
235. Id
236. Id
237. The V.A.'s doctrine of "reasonable doubt" contrasts sharply with the allocation of
the burden of proof in a civil case.
Even if the V.A.'s doctrine of "reasonable doubt" did mean that the V.A. carried the
burden of persuasion, the burden of producing evidence would still remain as it does,
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V.A. procedure which places the burden of proof on the veteran, virtu-
ally precludes a veteran's recovery in radiation and Agent Orange
cases. 238 Since V.A. decisions are not appealable, a veteran can walk
into a V.A. office with affidavits from scientists, physicians, and physi-
cists saying that the problem is caused by radiation, and the V.A. can
deny it.239 There is no appeal.2' So, in spite of the V.A.'s statutory
scheme, veterans exposed to toxic substances during or after service are
receiving no compensation for their injuries.2 4 1 Unless they are given a
court remedy, with a more favorable burden of proof, veterans will be
unable to recovery for these injuries.2 4 2
When the post-service tort is examined in light of the reasons given
for military immunity, it is evident that since the recovery is for dam-
ages which occur after service, the cause of action will not interfere
with military discipline nor the military function of defending the
country.243 Modernly, V.A. benefits have not been interpreted as plac-
ing an upper limit on liability. 2' As a practical matter the benefits are
not compensating these veterans as the courts have expected.245 There-
fore, the post-service tort remedy is consistent with Feres and Stencel
and should be accepted by the courts. The post-service tort would im-
pose a duty on the government to inform veterans of their exposure to
harmful substances and would require follow up care after dis-
charge.246 The imposition of this duty could prevent the birth of defec-
tive children to chromosome-damaged servicemen and prevent the
early deaths of servicemen who, once informed of their exposure, could
seek early medical care.247 The frequency of new medical discoveries
make the cure for cancer and other diseases more likely. Surely a vet-
eran should have the right to know of the possibility of contracting
cancer so he may take advantage of these medical break-throughs. In
any case, a veteran should be made aware of the increased potential for
these diseases so an early medical treatment can be sought. As Justice
Richey stated in Thornwell, when referring to the military, "the perpe-
with the claimants. Because of the evidentiary void involved in these case, the V.A.'s
high rate of rejection for such claims is not surprising.
Comment, supra note 1, at 958-59 [citations omitted].
238. See Comment, supra note 1, at 958-60.




243. See Comment, supra note 41.
244. See Brown v. United States, 348 U.S. 110, 113 (1954).
245. De Dominicis, supra note 4, at 34.
246. See Thornwell, 471 F. Supp. at 350-53.
247. See generally Stanley v. CIA, 639 F.2d 1146, (5th Cir. 1981); Fountain v. United States,
533 F. Supp. 698 (W.D. Ark. 1981); Laswell v. Brown, 524 F. Supp. 847 (W.D. Mo. 1981) (all
demonstrations of deaths that were allegedly radiation related).
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trators of this wrong must be held accountable for their conduct.."248 It
is the duty of the court to protect these veterans since Congress has
refused to interfere with court-created military immunity.249 Veterans
who risk their lives for this country should not go uncompensated for
severe injuries inflicted upon them by government.
CONCLUSION
This comment has demonstrated the harsh results produced by the
doctrine of military immunity. The military has exposed servicemen to
toxic substances and used them as human "guinea pigs" and then dis-
charged them ignorant of their fate.25° Veterans have had little success
with their attempts to penetrate this immunity.25' Private Thornvell
was successful in using the Supreme Court's reasoning in the Brooks
and Brown decisions and recovered for his injuries which were incurred
after his discharge.252 This cause of action permitted a court remedy
for the failure by the government to inform a veteran of what had been
done to him and for the failure by the government to provide follow up
care to veterans known to have been used in experimentation.253 Un-
fortunately, this post-service tort has not been accepted by some federal
courts. The courts denying recovery have failed to distinguish the orig-
inal tort of exposure from the subsequent tort of the government's fail-
ure to warn after discharge.254 Recently the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals in Broudy v. United States, and the Eastern District Court of
Pennsylvania in Everette v. United States have allowed post-service tort
recovery.255 However, due to the different interpretations of the theory
there still exists much confusion in this area of the law. In order for the
Supreme Court to accept the post-service tort theory, it must withstand
scrutiny under the court created reasons for military immunity.25 6 This
comment has analyzed the post-service tort theory under the Court's
rationale for government immunity and has demonstrated that since
the theory allows recovery only for injuries caused after service, recov-
ery will not interfere with military autonomy. Military officers will not
be on trial for their command decisions since the recovery is post serv-
ice and the duty arises only upon discharge. A procedure for warning
248. 471 F. Supp. at 352.
249. See generally, Comment, supra note 41 (this Comment also advocates acceptance of the
post-service 
tort).
250. See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
251. See supra notes 63-65.
252. See generally Thornwell, 471 F. Supp. 344.
253. Id
254. See supra notes 119-120.
255. See supra notes 85 & 160 and accompanying text.
256. Stencel v. United States, 431 U.S. 666, 670 (1977).
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veterans can be effected through the V.A. and therefore will not inter-
fere with the special function of the military in protecting the country.
In addition, this comment has demonstrated that the courts cannot jus-
tify denial of a tort remedy because of the simple, sure remedy suppos-
edly provided by veterans compensation. The government exposed
thousands of servicemen to radiation and Agent Orange. These veter-
ans are not receiving any redress for their injuries. Unless the courts
accept the post-service tort these veterans will remain uncompensated.
Lorna Hislop-Brumfield

